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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

v.

:

RICHARD M. GURULE,

:

Case No. 920099-CA

Priority No. 10

Defendant-Appellant. :
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant Richard M. Gurule appeals from an
interlocutory trial court order permitting, in part, admission of
eyewitness identification testimony in a prosecution for
aggravated assault, a third degree felony under Utah Code Ann. §
76-5-103 (1990).

The order was entered by the Third Judicial

District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah, the Honorable James S.
Sawaya, presiding.
This Court granted defendant's petition for
interlocutory review on March 26, 1992 (order copied at Addendum
A to Br. of Appellant).

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 1992).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The issue presented by defendant will be addressed in
this brief under two points:
1.

Did the trial court correctly rule that eyewitness

identification testimony, based upon events witnessed prior to an
illegal police search and "showup," is sufficiently reliable to

be heard at defendant's trial?

In reviewing a decision to admit

eyewitness identification testimony, the trial court's findings
of underlying fact are reviewed deferentially for clear error.
However, "whether these facts are sufficient to demonstrate
reliability [of an eyewitness identification] is a question of
law, which [appellate courts] review for correctness."
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782 (Utah 1991).

State v.

As set forth in the body

of this brief, this latter statement actually allows for some
deference to the trial court's ruling.
2.

See id. at 784.

Did the trial court correctly rule that the

eyewitness identification testimony is not the "tainted fruit" of
the subsequent illegal search, and is therefore admissible?

The

Utah Supreme Court reviews the question of whether evidence is
tainted by prior police misconduct nondeferentially, as a matter
of law.

State v. Thurman, 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 26 (Utah

January 7, 1993).

However, as set forth more fully in the body

of this brief, the question of whether eyewitness testimony might
be tainted by subsequent police misconduct is largely a question
of fact, reviewed for clear error.

See United States v. Crews,

445 U.S. 463, 473, 100 S. Ct. 1244, 1251 (1980).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The first point on appeal implicates Article I, section
7 of the Utah Constitution, which states:

"No person shall be

deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of
law."

The second point implicates the scope of the exclusionary

rule as a remedy for police violation of the fourth amendment,
2

"unreasonable searches and seizures" provision of the United
States Constitution.

Both constitutional provisions are set

forth in Addendum B to the Brief of Appellant.

Other pertinent

constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules will be set forth
as necessary in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
As set forth in the Brief of Appellant, defendant now
stands charged with one count of aggravated assault (R. 3, 67J.1

Defendant moved to suppress all eyewitness trial testimony

identifying him as the assailant, and to suppress all evidence
acquired as the result of an illegal police search of his home
(R. 20, 25, copied at Addendum C to Br. of Appellant).
The trial court agreed that police, investigating the
assault, had illegally entered and searched defendant's home (R.
35; trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law, R. 3236, are copied at Addendum E to Br. of Appellant).

Accordingly,

all evidence acquired after that search, including a "showup"
identification of defendant, was ordered suppressed (R. 35). The
trial court also ruled that the showup had been conducted under
"suggestive circumstances" (R. 36).
Upon the State's objection, and upon subsequent
argument and memoranda (R. 37-39, 42-59), the trial court
clarified its order suppressing evidence.

The court specifically

ruled that "eyewitness identification evidence obtained prior to
Citations to the main record are designated R. 1-146;
transcript citations are R. 147-367 (large volume of one hearing),
and R. 368-78 (small volume covering two hearings).
3

the illegal search and seizure may properly be offered and
admitted if otherwise competent, and is not to be suppressed as
part of the Court's prior order . . . " (R. 130; supplemental
findings and conclusions, R. 128-31, copied at Addendum G to Br.
of Appellant).

Defendant appeals from this ruling, arguing that

all eyewitness identification testimony must be suppressed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant is charged with aggravated assault upon Dale
Haddenham, who was a guest of the Knowlden family, in West Valley
City, one night in May, 1990 (R. 6, 173, 225). The most critical
facts pertinent to this appeal involve the events surrounding the
assault, but prior to the improper search and the ensuing showup.
Those facts are as follows:
On the night in question, the Knowlden family, Dale
Haddenham, and other friends were having a small party (R. 155,
173, 224-25).

Eddy Knowlden, Rodney Knowlden, Jody Knowlden,

Haddenham, and the other guests were watching television when "a
bunch of strangers" appeared inside the Knowlden home (R. 17 3,
225).

One of these intruders announced, "We are here to party or

trash the place, it's your choice" (R. 174). After a brief
exchange of unpleasantries, the intruders retreated (R. 175,
226).

The retreat was tumultuous:

Dorothy Knowlden, who had

been surprised in her kitchen by one intruder—a "small boy," was
knocked down in the process (R. 156, 158, 165).
On the "spur of the moment," Dale Haddenham, Rodney
Knowlden, and Eddy Knowlden pursued the intruders (R. 175, 2274

28)•

Jody Knowlden paused to assist Dorothy Knowlden, then

apparently joined the pursuit (R. 158).
Dale Haddenham led the pursuit.

Rodney Knowlden, close

behind, saw a man step from behind a truck parked in the Knowlden
driveway.

The man hit Haddenham in the head with a baseball bat,

knocking him "clear off his feet," and breaking the bat (R. 22829).

Eddy Knowlden did not witness the exact instant of the

blow, for he was momentarily distracted by another stranger
emerging from behind a tree (R. 177-78).

However, he did see

Haddenham fall to the ground, saw "something flying through the
air," and saw Haddenhamfs assailant holding the apparent bat
handle (R. 180, 193-94).

The record does not reveal what Jody

Knowlden saw, for he did not testify at the hearing of the motion
to suppress.2

It appears that Jody Knowlden, if he witnessed

the attack, did so from a greater distance than did Rodney and
Eddy Knowlden (R. 45, 148, 362).
Although it was well past sunset, the scene was
illuminated by several lights (R. 168-69, 180, 229). Rodney
Knowlden viewed the assailant face to face, at a distance of
about eleven feet, for "approximately seven, eight seconds"
immediately after Haddenham fell (R. 229-30).

He could see that

the assailant had blood spatters on his shirt; indeed, Rodney
himself was spattered with Haddenham's blood (R. 238). Rodney,
defendant has not incorporated the preliminary hearing
transcript, which might describe Jody Knowlden's testimony, into
the record on appeal. Haddenham apparently never saw, or could not
remember, his assailant. An investigating officer later found
"half of a bat" at the scene (R. 267).
5

who stated that he has "perfect" eyesight, described the
assailant as "about five foot six, heavy-set, hundred eighty,
hundred ninety pounds, black hair.

He had a black kind of a

beard right here on his chin, just a strip of hair" (R. 230-31),
Rodney Knowlden also filled out a written witness
statement on the night of the assault, describing Haddenham's
assailant as "a [M]exican male, approx[i]mately, 5'6" tall 200
lbs. . . . He had a small beard on the end of his chin"
(Defendant's exhibit 6, admitted at R. 249-50, copied at Appendix
I of this brief).

At the hearing on defendant's motion to

suppress, Rodney Knowlden unequivocally testified that he filled
out his witness statement before identifying defendant, at the
showup, as Haddenham's assailant (R. 234). The lead
investigating officer also testified that witness statements were
sought before the showup (R. 280).
Eddy Knowlden reported that "[e]verybody just stopped"
moving for "[m]aybe ten seconds" after Haddenham was bludgeoned
(R. 182, 205-06).

Haddenham, he saw, was "just covered with

blood" (R. 180). Eddy, who is nearsighted and was not wearing
his corrective lenses at the time, described the assailant as a
"kid" who was "short and stocky" (R. 182-83, 186). He viewed the
assailant from an uncertain distance, in the range of six to
thirteen feet (R. 179, 239). Again, the present record does not
reveal just what Jody Knowlden saw.

6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The pre-search, pre-showup identification of Dale
Haddenham's assailant is sufficiently reliable for admission
under Utah's state constitution-based criteria.

Compared to

State v. Ramirez, the Utah Supreme Court's leading case on point,
the eyewitnesses here had a far better opportunity to accurately
observe and describe the assailant.

Because the identification

testimony in Ramirez was held sufficiently reliable to be
admitted, the more reliable testimony here is surely admissible
as well.
The eyewitness identification testimony was not
"tainted" by the police misconduct that occurred subsequent to
the assault.

Defendant's "retroactive taint" theory does have

support in federal case dictum.

However, that theory should not

compel suppression here, for the record demonstrates that the
eyewitness testimony in issue is founded upon observations that
were independent of the subsequent police misconduct.
INTRODUCTION TO ARGUMENT: ISSUE CLARIFICATION
Nature of the Appealed-from Ruling
To resolve this appeal, it is first necessary to
confirm the nature of the trial court's evidentiary ruling.
Defendant states:

"[T]he trial judge's ruling appears to

preclude an in-court identification but allow a pre-seizure
description" of him (Br. of Appellant at 17). To the contrary,
the appealed-from ruling is not so favorable to defendant.

7

The ruling simply states:

"[T]he eyewitness

identification evidence obtained prior to the illegal search and
seizure may properly be offered and admitted if otherwise
competent, and is not to be suppressed as part of the Court's
prior order dated May 8, 1991" (Supplemental Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, at R. 130, copied in Addendum G to Br. of
Appellant).

This ruling contains no indication that the trial

court intends to prohibit the State's competent eyewitnesses from
pointing out defendant, to the trial jury, as the person who
bludgeoned Dale Haddenham.
Nor does anything else in the record support
defendant's assertion that only the pre-search, pre-showup
description of Haddenham's assailant may be received.

In fact,

during argument of the State's request to allow pre-search
identification testimony, the trial court expressed a contrary
intention:

"I will make it as clear as I can on the record that

I have no intention of suppressing any evidence, identification
evidence based upon events that occurred prior to the search" (R.
370, emphasis added).

This shows an intention to allow all pre-

search eyewitness identification testimony that is competent
under Rules 601 and 602, Utah Rules of Evidence, and Utah Code
Ann. §§ 78-24-1 and -2 (1992).

The court's written ruling thus

contemplates that the State's witnesses, provided they establish
personal knowledge under Rule 602, will be allowed to point out
defendant, at trial, as Haddenham's assailant.

8

Certainly, as a form of alternative relief, defendant
might ask this Court to reverse the foregoing ruling in part,
barring the State's witnesses from specifically identifying him
at trial, yet allowing them to describe Haddenham's assailant as
he appeared in the immediate aftermath of the assault.

However,

defendant ought not be allowed to indirectly carve away the trial
court's ruling, by imposing, upon the State and this Court, his
own notion of what that ruling "appears" to mean.
On appeal, then, the State treats the trial court's
ruling as allowing in-court identification of defendant, so long
as such identification is based upon events actually observed by
the State's witnesses, and that occurred before the improper
search, and before the "suggestive" showup.

That ruling should

be affirmed.
The Eyewitness Testimony in Issue
Defendant first argues that Dorothy Knowlden cannot
give eyewitness identification testimony (Br. of Appellant at 1821).

Although Mrs. Knowlden was arguably assaulted during the

fracas at her home, defendant is not charged with assaulting her;
again, he is only charged with assaulting Dale Haddenham (R. 6).
At trial, the State will not call Mrs. Knowlden to identify
defendant as Dale Haddenham's assailant.
Mrs. Knowlden only saw the -small boy" who entered her
kitchen, and about six other intruders (R. 156-57, 165). She did
not witness the assault on Haddenham, for she was knocked down
inside the home as the intruders fled.

9

By the time she looked

outside, Haddenham had already been attacked, and was being
assisted by Rodney, Eddy, and Jody Knowlden (R. 158). Thus even
though Mrs, Knowlden professed to remember a person with "a small
goatee" as having somehow been involved (R. 166), she cannot
identify that person as Haddenham's assailant.
At trial, the State will call Mrs. Knowlden to describe
the intrusion that preceded the assault on Haddenham.

She also

has useful testimony to give regarding the lighting conditions in
the area of the assault, and in placing Rodney, Eddy, and Jody
Knowlden within view of the assault (R. 158, 168-69).

However,

because she did not witness the assault itself, she is not
competent to describe Haddenham's assailant.

See Utah R. Evid.

602 (personal knowledge of matter in issue required).

Therefore,

consistent with the trial court's ruling, Mrs. Knowlden will not
be asked to identify defendant as the assailant.
As stated in its memorandum to the trial court, the
State does wish to elicit eyewitness identification testimony
from Rodney, Eddy, and Jody Knowlden (R. 45). As already set
forth, Rodney and Eddy Knowlden witnessed the assault on
Haddenham from rather close range.

Jody Knowlden evidently

viewed the assault from a longer distance, because he stopped to
assist Dorothy Knowlden before joining Rodney and Eddy in pursuit
of the intruders (R. 45, 148, 362).
It remains incumbent upon the State to lay the full
foundation for admission of Jody Knowlden's testimony at trial.
Jody apparently testified at the preliminary hearing of this case
10

(R. 362). However, defendant has not incorporated the transcript
of that hearing into the record on appeal.

Thus neither this

Court nor the State's appellate counsel can now fully review
whether Jody Knowlden's identification testimony is admissible.
In this brief, then, the State will focus upon the
eyewitness identification testimony of Rodney and Eddy Knowlden.
The trial court's ruling admitting that testimony should be
affirmed.

The State will comment briefly upon the possible

admissibility of Jody Knowlden's testimony.

That question will

have to be fully addressed when this case, still in pretrial
posture, returns to the trial court.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT THE
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY IS
SUFFICIENTLY RELIABLE TO BE HEARD AT TRIAL.
Defendant assails the testimony of Rodney, Eddy, and
Jody Knowlden as unreliable, under State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774
(Utah 1991).

In Ramirez, the Utah Supreme Court established

reliability standards for admission of eyewitness identification
testimony under the Utah Constitution's "due process" clause,
Article I, section 7.

Those standards meet, and probably exceed,

existing federal reliability standards.

817 P.2d at 780, 784.

Ramirez established a five-factor inquiry for
eyewitness reliability, and admissibility of eyewitness
identification testimony.

The factors are:

(1) [T]he opportunity of the witness to view
the actor during the event; (2) the witness's
11

degree of attention to the actor at the time
of the event; (3) the witness's capacity to
observe the event, including his or her
physical and mental acuity; (4) whether the
witness's identification was made
spontaneously and remained consistent
thereafter, or whether it was the product of
suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event
being observed and the likelihood that the
witness would perceive, remember and relate
it correctly. This last area includes such
factors as whether the event was an ordinary
one in the mind of the observer during the
time it was observed, and whether the race of
the actor was the same as the observer's.
817 P.2d at 781. This inquiry is derived from a precautionary
jury instruction established in State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 493
(Utah 1986) .
A.

Appellate Review Under Ramirez.
Making the foregoing reliability inquiry, the Ramirez

court actually affirmed a trial court's decision, characterized
as "an extremely close case," 817 P.2d at 784, to allow
eyewitness identification testimony against a reliability
challenge.3

It did so after "considering the facts in the light

most favorable to the trial court's decision and giving due
deference to the trial judge's ability to appraise demeanor
evidence," id., at 784. Therefore, even though purporting to
review the trial court's reliability decision nondeferentially,
id. at 782, it is evident that the supreme court gave at least
some deference to the trial court's decision.

This appears

Ultimately, the admission of that testimony was reversed,
upon the distinctive ground that the trial court had failed to
determine whether the testimony was the inadmissible "fruit" of an
illegal detention. Id., at 788-89. That ground, also advanced
here, is addressed in Point Two of this brief.
12

appropriate, given that a trial court's eyewitness reliability
ruling is necessarily a "judgment call." ££.. State v.
Richardson, 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 40, 45-46 (Utah App. December 10,
1992) (Bench, P.J., concurring).
It should also be borne in mind that the Ramirez
admissibility inquiry is a "gatekeeping" decision.

Ramirez, 817

P.2d at 778. While the inquiry is important, having
constitutional dimension, see id. / it is also provisional, and
does not constitute the final word on the reliability of
eyewitness testimony.

That determination belongs to the trial

jury, as instructed under Long.

The fact that the threshold

decision to admit eyewitness testimony is provisional also weighs
against overly intrusive appellate review, particularly on an
interlocutory basis.
Defendant implies that the State carries the burden, on
appeal, of establishing the reliability of the proffered
eyewitness identification testiomony here (e.g., Br. of Appellant
at 23: "[T]he State cannot sustain its burden . . . " ) .

Ramirez

teaches that the State must shoulder the admissibility burden in
the trial court.

817 P.2d at 778. However, the trial court's

decision to admit the testimony here amounts to a judgment that
the State did sustain its burden.

On appeal, that judgment

deserves a presumption of correctness. According to State v.

*But see State v. Stilling, 770 P.2d 137, 143 (Utah 1989) ("We
decided Long [which underpins Ramirez! on neither federal nor state
constitutional principles, but rather as a result of our
supervisory capacity over the lower courts").
13

Jones, 657 P. 2d 1263, 1267 (Utah 1982), the burden of overcoming
that presumption, whatever the standard of appellate review may
be, rests upon defendant.
Bearing the foregoing principles in mind, the trial
court's decision to admit the challenged eyewitness
identification testimony should be affirmed under the Ramirez
five-factor inquiry.

As follows, affirmance is especially proper

when the facts here are compared to those in Ramirez.
B.

Rodney Knowlden's Testimony.
(1) Opportunity to View.
Turning to the first Ramirez factor, defendant

acknowledges that Rodney Knowlden saw the assailant strike
Haddenham, and stared at the assailant face to face, from about
eleven feet away, in an illuminated area, for about seven or
eight seconds (Br. of Appellant at 25). 5 His "suggestion" (id.)
that Rodney had a poor opportunity to view the assailant is
therefore implausible.

Rodney's opportunity was obviously better

than that of the Ramirez eyewitness, where the distance,
lighting, and viewing time were inconsistently described, and the
gunman to be identified had concealed his face with a mask.

817

P.2d at 782.

3

The trial court formally found that two witnesses to the
assault viewed the assailant for five seconds and two seconds,
respectively (R. 35). This contradicts the testimony of Rodney and
Eddy Knowlden, who reported viewing times of seven to eight, and
about ten seconds, respectively (R. 205-06, 230, 182). On appeal,
defendant appears to accept Rodney's and Eddy's testimony over the
trial court's finding.
14

(2) Degree of Attention.
The second Ramirez factor is also far less problematic
here.

The Ramirez witness, while attempting to scrutinize the

masked gunman, was under assault by another man wielding a pipe.
817 P.2d at 783.
distraction.

Rodney Knowlden was burdened by no such

He did notice "[p]eople everywhere" as he pursued

the intruders (R. 227). However, once Haddenham was bludgeoned,
Rodney's pursuit stopped, and his attention focused upon
Haddenham's assailant (R. 230).
(3) Capacity to Observe.
Regarding this factor, defendant claims only that
"Rodney had apparently been drinking" (Br. of Appellant at 26).6
However, Rodney declared that he had drunk but one beer at the
time he witnessed the assault (R. 247). The lead investigating
officer, while he could smell alcohol about the witnesses, also
reported that none of them appeared intoxicated (R. 273).
Rodney Knowlden also described the assault and the
scene in reasonable detail, belying any suggestion that his
observational capacity was impaired (R. 237-41).

Rodney reported

that he has "perfect" eyesight (R. 231). Even though the episode
must have been stressful, .cf. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783, Rodney
himself was not injured in the attack.

In short, "there is

nothing in the record to indicate that [Rodney] was impaired by
fatigue, injury, drugs, or alcohol."
6

See id.

Rodney's showup identification of defendant (Br. of Appellant
at 26) is irrelevant to the question of his capacity to observe the
assault earlier.
15

(4) Spontaneous, Not the Product of Suggestion.
The trial court found that "the police failed to obtain
or maintain any permanent record regarding descriptions of the
assailant prior to the time the 'showup' occurred" (R. 34,
Addendum E to Br. of Appellant).

This finding is clearly

erroneous, for it is contrary to the clear weight of the
evidence.

See State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987).
It is quite true that the lead investigating officer,

Mattfeld (R. 272), did not personally take a description of
Haddenham's assailant before proceeding to defendant's home (R.
263, 280). Instead, responding to the perceived urgency of the
situation when he arrived at the Knowlden home, Officer Mattfeld
"just got some statements to find out what happened" (R. 275).
He then went to defendant's home, as directed by the excited
witnesses (R. 262-63).
However, upon defense counsel's cross-examination,
Mattfeld specifically stated that he had the witnesses from the
Knowlden home begin writing their own statements after he had
gone into defendant's home, but before the showup (R. 275). Also
upon cross-examination, and consistent with Officer Mattfeld,
Rodney Knowlden testified that he completed his written statement
before he viewed the showup (R. 233-34).7

7

No evidence

Trial defense counsel, who drafted the trial court's findings
of fact, apparently overlooked or disregarded the specific
testimony, elicited by his own cross-examination, that contradicts
the finding in dispute here. The witness exclusion rule was in
effect during the evidentiary hearing, so that Mattfeld and Rodney
did not hear each other's testimony (R. 149-50).
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contradicts this testimony (copied at Appendix II of this brief).
See Linam v. King, 804 P.2d 1235, 1238 (Utah App. 1991) (finding
was clearly erroneous where the only record evidence was contrary
to it).

Clearly, then, at least one description of Haddenham's

assailant was obtained and maintained prior to the showup.
Further, Rodney Knowlden's description remained
reasonably consistent.

His written statement (copied at Appendix

I of this brief) described the assailant as "a [M]exican male,
approx[i]mately, 5'6" tall 200 lbs. [with] a small beard on the
end of his chin."

Rodney varied from this only slightly at the

hearing of the motion to suppress, describing the assailant as
five feet, six inches tall, with black hair, and heavy-set—some
180 to 190 pounds (R. 230). He also put the assailant in a
light-colored, blood-spattered shirt (R. 238). The goatee-type
beard was a consistent descriptive feature (R. 230, 242).
Rodney Knowlden's description of the assailant is more
consistent than the descriptions in Ramirez.

Those descriptions

varied among the several witnesses, and over time, in such
distinctive particulars as whether the accused wore a hat, and in
whether he was tattooed.

817 P.2d at 783-84.

The only variance

here lies in a ten- to twenty-pound difference in Rodney's
estimate of the assailant's weight; however, his description
remained one of a short, heavily-set individual.

Further, Eddy

Knowlden's description of a Hshort and stocky" assailant, also in
a light-colored shirt (R. 183), is consistent with Rodney's
description, albeit less detailed.
17

As just noted, Rodney Knowlden reported that the
assailant's shirt was spattered with blood immediately after the
assault (R. 238). This detail also supports the spontaneous
nature of the description, for upon viewing the showup, Rodney
Knowlden observed that defendant—whom he identified as the
assailant—had changed his shirt (R. 231).8

This supports a

determination that Rodney's ability to identify defendant from
the assault was the product of his own observation, not of
suggestion:

were this not so, it seems unlikely that he would

have noticed the shirt change at the showup.
Further, even though at trial the State cannot
introduce evidence that defendant was identified at the showup,
that showup was not so suggestive as to require suppression of
all identification testimony based upon earlier events. Again,
Ramirez provides a striking contrast:

There the defendant was

the only person in the showup, and was handcuffed; the police who
had apprehended him may have made suggestive comments to the
witnesses.

The supreme court characterized that showup as

"blatantly suggestive.M

817 P.2d at 784.

Here defendant was not handcuffed, and was arrayed with
several other non-police in the showup (R. 268, 275). Even
though some witnesses may have encouraged each other to identify
8

He testified that at the show-up, defendant wore "a darker
shaded shirt. It was untucked. It hung down over his pants."
This pretrial testimony about the show-up, even though not
admissible at trial, may be considered in deciding whether
testimony about the assault may be heard. See United States v.
Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 472-73 n.18, 100 S. Ct. 1244, 1250-51 n.18
(1980) (discussed more fully in Point Two of this brief).
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defendant (R. 302, 313), there is no evidence that the police
themselves gave such verbal encouragement•

Indeed, the officers

took the witnesses to the showup one person at a time, in an
evident effort to reduce witness-to-witness suggestibility (R.
302, 313; R. 201-02, 230, 269). Compare Ramirez, 817 P.2d at
777, 784 (three witnesses viewed robbery suspect together, from
within police car).
Further, the "suggestive circumstances" of the showup
were caused in part by defendant himself:

he attempted to hide

behind the other showup subjects, and was admonished to cooperate
(R. 185-86, 270, 301). All in all, then, even crediting the
trial court's finding of "suggestive circumstances" here (R. 36),
the police handling of this showup was a far cry from that in
Ramirez.
(5) Nature of the Event.
Addressing the final Ramirez factor, this was clearly a
traumatic event:

Rodney Knowlden witnessed a potentially lethal

ambush on his friend.

Certainly Rodney could not provide a

minutely exact description of the assailant, given these
circumstances.

However, contrary to defendant's argument (Br. of

Appellant at 28), and as already set forth, he gave a reasonably
detailed description of a rather distinctive-appearing assailant.
That description has remained reasonably consistent, and ought
not be barred from trial merely because he achieved it under
frightening circumstances•

19

All in all, Rodney Knowlden's testimony here is far
less problematic than that reviewed in Ramirez.

Because the

Ramirez eyewitness identification testimony was nevertheless
deemed sufficiently reliable to be admitted, the State's
proffered testimony of Rodney Knowlden in this case has been,
surely, properly ruled admissible by the trial court.
C.

Eddy Knowlden's Testimony.
(1) Opportunity to View.
Eddy Knowlden was positioned six to thirteen feet from

the assailant (Br. of Appellant at 21, R. 206).9

He saw Dale

Haddenham fall, and saw the broken end of the bat that felled him
flying through the air (R. 193-94).

The area was lighted,

allowing Eddy to observe the "short and stocky" assailant for
some five to ten seconds (R. 182, 205-06).

Again, this was far

more reliable than the circumstances in Ramirez.
(2) Degree of Attention.
Defendant exaggerates Eddy Knowlden's distraction by
the stranger who emerged from behind a tree just before Haddenham
was bludgeoned.

Eddy only saw this stranger "getting up" from

behind the tree, with "something in their hands" (R. 177). He
did not claim that this person "jumped at him with a bat in his
hands," as defendant

reports

(Br. of Appellant at 22).

Again,

and obviously, Eddy was not distracted to nearly the degree of

9

Eddy's "apparent" preliminary hearing testimony that he was
eighteen feet away (Br. of Appellant at 21), is unsupported by the
record, for defendant has not incorporated the preliminary hearing
transcript into the record on appeal.
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the witness in Ramirez, who was himself under physical attack
during the witnessed events.
(3) Capacity to Observe.
Eddy Knowlden is nearsighted and was not wearing his
corrective lenses when Haddenham was assaulted.

This may explain

Eddy's failure to provide the same degree of detail in describing
Haddenham's assailant as did Rodney Knowlden.

Eddy stated that

he had consumed no more than two beers prior to witnessing the
assault (R. 216). Nothing suggests that Eddy's capacity to
observe was otherwise impaired.
Eddy did, however, readily identify defendant in the
showup (R. 187), indicating that his observations at the assault
scene were clear.

This, in turn, is consistent with his

statement that at six to eight feet—within his possible distance
from the assailant at the scene—his eyesight is good (R. 186).
Eddy's description of the assailant as "short and stocky,"
consistent with Rodney's description, appears to be reliable,
even if less detailed.
(4) Spontaneous, Not the Product of Suggestion.
There is no evidence that Eddy's description of the
assailant was the product of improper suggestion.

Like Rodney

Knowlden, Eddy believed that defendant, whom he picked from the
showup, had changed his shirt after the assault (R. 187). Again,
that showup was not "blatantly suggestive," as in Ramirez.
Again, Eddy's failure to provide a more elaborate description
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suggests that his description was not unfairly enhanced by the
showup procedure,
Eddy Knowlden's written witness statement (R. 202) has
not found its way into the record on appeal.

However, his

testimony is not per se inadmissible on this basis. Nothing in
Ramirez requires written or otherwise recorded pre-showup
identifications.

Further, as already noted, Eddy's rather close

and fairly extended opportunity to observe the assailant, even if
compromised somewhat by his nearsightedness, makes him a
competent witness under Rule 602, Utah Rules of Evidence.

The

remedy for any shortcomings in Eddy's testimony lies in defense
cross-examination at trial, not in outright suppression.
(5) Nature of the Event.
Again, this was a traumatic event. Again, the creation
of extreme trauma while committing a crime does not create a due
process right to exclude witnesses to the crime from testifying
to the best of their ability.
The record indicates that defendant is hispanic (R.
25).
race.

The State can find no record reference to the Knowldens'
Assuming, however, that Eddy Knowlden is white (cjE. Br. of

Appellant at 25), the most distinctive feature of the assailant,
noted by Eddy, appears to be his short and stocky build.
Accordingly, as in Ramirez, 817 P,2d at 783, 784, it does not
appear that Eddy's identification of the assailant is somehow
biased or clouded by racial discrepancies.
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As with Rodney Knowlden, Eddy Knowlden's eyewitness
identification testimony is less troublesome than the testimony
that was held, in Ramirez, to be adequately reliable.

The trial

court's decision to allow Eddy's testimony should be affirmed.
D.

Jodv Knowlden's Testimony.
As set forth earlier, the record on appeal contains no

testimony from Jody Knowlden.

It appears that Jody was

positioned to witness the assault on Haddenham, although from a
greater distance than did Rodney and Eddy (R. 362). If he did
witness the assault, and if he identifies the assailant
consistently with Rodney and Eddy, it would appear that Jody,
too, should be allowed to give his identification testimony.
Because this case is still in a pretrial posture, the State
should be permitted to lay this necessary foundation for Jody
Knowlden's testimony in the trial court.

Meanwhile, this Court

should affirm the admissibility of the eyewitness identification
testimony offered by Rodney and Eddy Knowlden.
POINT TWO
THE EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY WAS
NOT IMPERMISSIBLY "TAINTED" BY POLICE
MISCONDUCT THAT OCCURRED AFTER THE ASSAULT.
Defendant next argues that the illegal entry into his
home, upon which he was apprehended and placed in the showup,
plus the suggestive circumstances of the showup, impermissibly
"tainted" the witnesses' identification of him.

The trial court

suppressed the identification testimony from the showup itself.
Defendant, however, argues that the court should have suppressed
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even the testimony that identifies him only from the witnesses'
observations of the assault upon Dale Haddenham.

This argument

should be rejected.
A.

Appellate Review of "Retroactive Taint" Theory.
In effect, defendant argues that Rodney, Eddy, and Jody

Knowldens' identification of the assailant, based upon their
observations of the assault, is not independent of the subsequent
police misconduct.10

Instead, he argues that the showup, made

possible by the illegal police entry into his home, impermissibly
enhanced, or "tainted," the Knowldens' prior memories of the
assailant (Br. of Appellant at 33).
Defendant cites no case where in-court identification
testimony following a flawed, in-the-field showup has been
suppressed under his argument, which may be characterized as one
of "retroactive taint."

The custodial "lineup" cases he cites,

implicating the right to have counsel present during lineups (Br.
of Appellant at 17), are not on-point.
However, the United States Supreme Court has stated
that suppression might, at times, be appropriate in the context
of a showup that is associated with police misconduct.

See

United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 472-73, 100 S. Ct. 1244,
1250-51 (1980).

The test for the admissibility of testimony that

recounts pre-misconduct events is a variant of the familiar
"fruit of the poisonous tree" or "attenuation" analysis,
10

Future reference to Rodney, Eddy, and Jody will be
collectively to "the Knowldens," with the understanding that
Dorothy Knowlden is not included within such reference.
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traditionally applied to evidence obtained after police
misconduct.

Crews, 445 U.S. at 470-74 & n.19, 100 S. Ct. at

1249-51 & n.19 (citing authorities).
For eyewitness identification testimony to be
attenuated from a possible "retroactive taint,M three elements
must be satisfied:

(1) the eyewitness must be present at trial

to testify about the crime and the offender, and to identify the
defendant as the offender; (2) the eyewitness must have knowledge
of and the ability to reconstruct the crime and identify the
offender that are independent of the police misconduct; (3) the
defendant must be present in the courtroom, so that the witness
can compare him or her to the appearance of the offender at the
time of the crime.

445 U.S. at 471, 100 S. Ct. at 1250.u

second element is critical to this case:

The

defendant argues that

the Knowldens lack the ability, independent of the search and
ensuing showup, to identify him as Haddenham's assailant.
The trial court, briefed under Crews (R. 45, 71-82),
rejected defendant's argument, implicitly determining that the
Knowldens are able to identify Haddenham's assailant, based
solely upon their contemporaneous observation of him during and
immediately after the assault.

In traditional attenuation

analysis, Utah appellate courts grant no deference to trial court
rulings.

State v. Thurman, 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 26 (Utah

11

Crews dealt with a victim-witness, and its attenuation test
refers to the "victim." The State discerns no difference between
a victim-witness and a nonvictim-witness, for the purpose of the
Crews analysis, and therefore refers to "eyewitness."
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January 7, 1993).

However, the "independent identification"

element in issue here is a factual finding, by the trial court,
that the in-court identification of the accused is uninfluenced
by any improper pretrial identifications.

Crews, 445 U.S. at

473, 100 S. Ct. at 1251. Accord State v. Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d
289, 292 (Utah 1982), cert, denied, 460 U.S. 1044, 103 S. Ct.
1443 (1983).
The "independent identification" finding must be
supported by clear and convincing evidence.

United States v.

Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 240, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 1939 (1967).
Nevertheless, once made, the finding should receive the deference
normally accorded to factual findings under Rule 52(a), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure—that is, it should be reversed only for
clear error.

This is entirely appropriate, for the trial court,

to make such a finding, must necessarily assess the demeanor, and
hence the credibility, of the challenged witnesses.
quintessentially a trial court function.

This is

State v. Vigil, 815

P.2d 1296, 1299 (Utah App. 1991).
B.

Identification Independent of, or Untainted by,
the Police Misconduct.
In this case, the trial court did not clearly err in

finding that Rodney and Eddy Knowlden can independently identify
defendant as Dale Haddenham's assailant. As set forth in Point
One of this brief, the trial court's finding is supported by
Rodney's and Eddy's rather detailed testimony, relating their
close-range view of the assault and of the distinctive-appearing
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assailant, still holding the broken bat, immediately after
Haddenham was struck.
Although the trial jury will not hear testimony about
the showup, the fact that Rodney and Eddy promptly selected
defendant from it, as the assailant, supports a finding that they
had formed a clear mental image of him at the time of tne
assault.

See Crews, 445 U.S. at 472-73 & n.18, 100 S. Ct. at

1250-51 & n.18 (considering identification at improper show-up,
even though itself suppressed, as evidence that independent basis
for identification existed).

At the showup, both Rodney and Eddy

recognized that defendant had apparently changed his shirt
following the assault (R. 187, 231); this further supports a
finding that they had a clear image of the assailant before, and
independently of, the showup.

Finally, while the record does not

record defendant's height and weight, it seems safe to surmise
that he does indeed resemble the short, stocky assailant
described by Rodney and Eddy.
Under Crews, see id., all the above factors support a
finding that Rodney and Eddy Knowlden can, independently of the
showup, identify defendant as Haddenham's assailant.

A full

competency foundation remains to be laid for the identification
testimony of Jody Knowlden; subject to that caveat, his
testimony, too, should be admissible.

In sum, the Knowldens'

eyewitness identification testimony, because it "neither resulted
from nor was biased by" the improper police search and the
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showup, 445 U.S. at 473, 100 S. Ct. at 1251, therefore may
properly be heard at trial.
C.

Other Considerations Supporting Admission of the
Eyewitness Identification Testimony.
Several policy considerations also support the trial

court's decision to allow the Knowldens' eyewitness
identification testimony.

For one thing, Rule 602, Utah Rules of

Evidence, permits witnesses to testify about relevant matters of
which they have personal knowledge.

Defendant would sweep this

general competency rule aside here, barring the Knowldens from
testifying about the assault altogether, even though they clearly
have personal knowledge of it, only because police officers
committed error.

The Knowldens, who are hardly responsible for

the police error, should not be stripped of their right to
testify because of it.
Next, even though the police erred by entering
defendant's home without a warrant and without consent, that
error ought not labelled "flagrant," such that all evidence even
indirectly associated with it should be suppressed.

Cf. Thurman,

203 Utah Adv. Rep. at 21-22 ("flagrant" misconduct makes a
stronger case for suppression).

The officers responded too

hastily to an excited crowd of witnesses, who directed them to
defendant's home as the likely place where Haddenham's assailant
would be found (R. 33, 262-63).

This does not amount to a

willful violation of constitutional rights; at most, negligence
was present.

The evidence directly obtained from the improper

home entry has been legitimately suppressed.
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By asking to

suppress even testimonial witness evidence of events that were
observed before the home entry, defendant is seeking a remedy
that sweeps well beyond the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary
rule.

See Thurman, id. (attenuation analysis is tied to

deterrent purpose of exclusionary rule).
Defendant, quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,
240-41, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 1939 (1967), complains of possible
unfairness in the fact that, in order to impeach the Knowldens'
independent, in-court identification testimony, he may himself
have to reveal the "suggestive" showup that he has succeeded in
suppressing.
make:

This is a tactical decision for defense counsel to

the fact that the decision may be a hard one is no basis

for relieving counsel from having to make it at all.
Further, the question of "fairness" depends upon whose
ox is being gored.

The United States Constitution was

established to, among other things, "establish Justice, insure
domestic Tranquility, . . ., promote the general Welfare, and
secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity .
. .."

U.S. Const. Preamble.

argument is unduly one-sided.

Accordingly, defendant's "fairness"
Under the constitution—which

ought to protect the innocent as well as defendant—the Knowldens
should be allowed to seek redress, at trial, for the violent
disruption of their own tranquility and liberty.

They offer

testimony that, apparently powerfully, implicates defendant as
the person who most violently disrupted their family gathering.
They should be allowed to give that testimony.
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Finally, it remains to be seen whether at trial,
defendant will be convicted.
since the events in question.

Nearly three years have elapsed
Defendant may be able to impeach

the Knowldens' testimony sufficiently to raise a reasonable doubt
about his guilt.

To effectively bar trial altogether now, upon

the dubious constitutional argument advanced by defendant, seems
premature and unnecessary.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's judgment,
allowing eyewitness identification testimony, stemming from
observations that were made before any police misconduct
occurred, should be affirmed.

This Court should so order, and

this case should proceed to trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ M

day of March, 1993.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

J. «EVIN MURPHY
Assistant Attorney General
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APPENDIX I
Written Witness Statement of Rodney Knowlden
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APPENDIX II
Evidence that Written Witness Statements were Prepared
Before the Showup:
Testimony of Rodney Knowlden (R. 233-34)
Testimony of Officer Mattfeld (R. 275-80)
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MR. BRADSHAW:

The lighting must be different

from that side of the room.
THE COURT:

I agree. It does look black.

MR. BRADSHAW:

Could the record reflect that the

defendants shirt is in fact black?
THE COURT:

I am not going to make that judgment.

If you want to —•
MR. BRADSHAW:

I don't know.

THE COURT: Are you satisfied with the record
that it's either black or dark blue?
MR. BRADSHAW; You gave a written statement to
the police?
A

Yes, sir, I did.

Q

Do you recall doing that?

A

Yes, sir.

Q

When was that in relationship to the showup when

you were asked to identify the person who hit Mr.
Haddenham?
A

That was in Eddy's house prior to the police

ever taking any of us outside.
$

It was before they asked you to give as much

detail as you could about the person you had seen hit Mr.
Haddenham?
A

Yes.

Q

Is that true?
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1

A

Yes, sir.

2

Q

And, in essence, the only detail you could

3

provide—in fact, Your Bonor, I think we should probably

4

make this part of the evidence.

5

THE COURT: What is it?

6

MR. BRADSHAW:

It is the statement he filled out

7

prior to the showup.

Banding you what's been marked as

8

defendant's exhibit 6, can you recognize that?

9

A

Yes, sir, I do.

10

Q

Is that the statement you gave to the police?

11

A

Yes, sir.

12

Q

That was filled out at the house prior to the

13

showup?

14

A

Yes, sir.

15

Q

This is the statement in which you were asked to

16

provide as much detail as you could about the person that

17

had assaulted Mr. Baddenham?

18

A

Yes, sir.

19

Q

And the description you gave was five six tall,

20

two hundred pounds; is that true?

21

A

Yes, sir.

22

Q

Small beard on the end of his chin; is that not

23

also true?

24

A

Yes, sir.

25

Q

Any other detail that you were able to give the
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COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT

1
2
3

A
happened.
Q

I just got some statements to find out what
Then I talked to the fire department.
All right. After you went in to the Gurule

4

house, you then went back across the street and took

5

statements from the individuals there?

6

A

Correct.

7

Q

And there are a series of written statements.

8

Were those taken at that point in time?

9

A

They were started at that point in time.

10

over there.

11

start on.

I talked to them.

I gave them statements to

Then I went back over to the Gurule house.

12

Q

And started setting up this lineup?

13

A

Yes, sir.

14

Q

This showup.

15

I went

There were four individuals as I

understand it in the showup?

16

A

I believe so.

17

Q

Do you have a record as to who appeared in the

18

I am not certain.

showup?

19

A

No, sir.

20

Q

At the showup, were the individuals handcuffed?

21

A

No, sir.

22

Q

Are you sure of that?

23

A

I am positive.

24

Q

None of the participants, none of the suspects

25

were handcuffed at that time?
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1

A

No, sir.

2

Q

As I understand it while you were setting this

3

up and getting the lights and getting the people standing

4

where they needed to stand, the people who had been at the

5

party across the street were all standing outside of their

6

house?

7

A

They were inside and outside.

8

Q

All right. Many of them outside?

9

A

Yes, sir.

10

Q

And they could clearly from where they were see

11
12

you setting this up?
A

Wasn't too much to set up.

I had them go

13

outside and stand in a straight line. My idea was to

14

basically use it is a screening process to see if I had the

15

right people.

16

Q

My question was not with regard to your purpose

17

but whether or not there were any obstructions, anything

18

that would preclude them from seeing what you were doing?

19

A

No, not unless they were to —

20

Q

You went over and asked some of these

21

individuals to come back and attempt to identify the person

22

who had assaulted Dale Baddenham?

23

A

Yes.

24

Q

And as I understand it, you asked them to come

25

over one at a time?
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1JV

A

Yes, sir.

Q

After they would make their identification, was

there anything to keep them from talking to anybody about
which one they had picked or anything like that?
A

I had them on one side of the street where

Officer Accocks was.

I would bring one forward.

I would

talk to them, then I would send them across the street to
another car so —
Q

I asked them to specifically not to talk.

All right. As I understand it, let me ask you

this first, how many people who were at that party
indicated to you that they might —

that they saw the

person assault Dale Baddenham?
A

I don't recall.

I only recall one.

Q

I am not asking you how many identified.

I am

asking how many people did you have attempt to identify?
In other words, people who said, "I saw it, let me see if I
can pick them out."
A

I didn't write their names down.

Q

Do you have a recollection it was like three or

four people, something like that?
A

Four to six people.

Q

Four to six people that you escorted across the

street and said can you tell me who was the person they saw
assault Mr. Haddenham?
A

I asked them who was in the house and who
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assaulted Mr. Haddenham.
Q

There was only one person that looked at the

3

lineup and said Mr. Gurule is the one that assaulted Dale

4

Haddenham.

5

A

I can only recall one.

6

Q

The others were not able to make an

7

identification or indicate that the person that they had

8

seen assault him wasn't in the lineup?

9
10
11

A

I cannot say whether they identified him or not.

I didn't put it in my report.
Q

I just don't recall.

But your independent recollection that of the

12

four to six people, there was only one that made a positive

13

identification of the defendant, Mr. Gurule?

14

A

As actually assaulting, yes.

15

Q

Others indicated that in fact Mr. Gurule was in

16
17

the house but was not the one that assaulted Mr. Haddenham?
A

They identified him as being in the house but

18

they did not say, no, he is not the one, he is not the one.

19

I don't recall who said they saw him assault and who

20

didn't.

21

Q

Okay. And I want this to be very clear.

In

22

terms of people who could positively say Mr. Gurule was the

23

person that assaulted Dale Haddenham, there was only one

24

that you can recall?

25

A

Correct.
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Q

But there are others that say that Mr. Gurule

was inside the house?
A

Correct.

Q

But could not offer a positive identification in

terms of assaulting Mr. Haddenham?
A

I don't recall whether they did or not.

Q

But your recollection is they could not or did

A

No, I don't recall whether they could or

not?

couldn't is what I am trying to say.
Q

Your specific recollection is that only one

could make a positive identification?
A

That's all I can recall, yes.

Q

In point of fact there were at least two that

specifically said Mr. Gurule was the one that went into the
house and tore the fingernail off Mrs. Knowlden, Dorothy
Knowlden and was the person that slammed the door into
Dorothy Knowlden, scaring her and making her almost fall
down?
A

Correct.

Q

Two people specifically identified Richard

Gurule as that person?
A

I didn't write down the names, like I say.

Q

And I didn't ask you for their name.
But there were at least two?
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1

A

There were at least two.

2

Q

That said he was the person in the house that

3

assaulted Dorothy Knowlden?

4

A

Yes.

5

Q

The person that Dale Haddenham was chasing at

6
7

the time he was hit?
A

It was my understanding he wasn't chasing at the

8

time.

9

walking down along the driveway.

10

Q

It's my understanding that he ran outside and was

All right.

Prior to conducting the lineup or

11

showup in this case, did you ask the witnesses to give you

12

a physical description of the person that they had seen

13

assault Mr. Haddenham?

14

A

Yes, sir.

15

Q

And did you record in some way the physical

16

description that each of these individuals gave to you?

17

A

I didn't put it in my report.

18

Q

Did you, as officer in charge—is there a report

19

anywhere that records the physical description,

20

characteristics that these witnesses described in regards

21

to the assailant of the Dale Haddenham?

22

A

No, sir.

23

Q

Do you have any independent recollection of what

24
25

they told you?
A

No, sir.
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